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I. INTRODUCTION

The People's Republic of China (PRC), commonly referred to as Mainland
China, is the largest nation in the World in terms of population, the
oldest continuous civilization on the planet, and, since the early 1980s,
* This article is a partially revised version of an article published in Austria in
2004 entitled: "Media Developments in East Asia: The Internet in China." This article
also contains commentary from two previous articles: Richard Cullen & D.W. Choy, The
Internet in China, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 99 (1999); and D.W. Choy, China and the Internet:
Recent Developments, 5 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 77 (2003). We would like to thank Professor
H.L. Fu of Hong Kong University whose work has been particularly relied upon for the
discussion of the impact of the Internet on public policy development in China. The
views expressed are those of the authors.
**
LL.B., D.Jur., Professor, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash
University, Melbourne, Australia.
*** LL.B., PCLL, LL.M., Senior Research Assistant, School of Law, City University
of Hong Kong, Hong Kong-China.

the fastest growing major power.' It is also home to the World's largest
One-Party-State (OPS)-run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Shortly after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, his successor as leader
of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping, announced the commencement of the
"Open-Door" policy. In essence, this policy endorsed whole-heartedly
China's economic re-engagement with the rest of the World and especially
the advanced Western World. This policy has remained the cornerstone
of PRC economic strategy ever since. Mainland China remains a vast,
massively populated country 2 beset by huge poverty developmental,
political, and environmental problems. But it also stands out as a beacon
of hope in so far as it has, more than any other large country, lifted
millions out of dire poverty over the last two decades. Some estimates
are that three hundred to four hundred million people in China have seen
their lives move beyond abject poverty over this period.3
As China has re-engaged with the World, it has not been able to
confine that relationship purely to economic matters. Offshore cultural
and political influences have become increasingly more important in
China since the 1980s. Authoritarianism shows few signs of withering,
however-indeed in many ways, it is stronger, than at anytime in the last
three hundred years. But the OPS has seen its capacity to micro-manage
the lives of its citizens shrink significantly. Today, the State's share of
GDP is about twenty-five percent of what it used to be in the 1970s.
True, GDP has increased enormously since then, so it is a share of a much
"larger cake," but today, China's wealth is progressively passing into
private hands. Wealth distribution-and redistribution-are subject to great
corruption and are far from fair. The fact remains, however, that the
1. The PRC is now primarily comprised of the PRC as it was created in 1949
when the Chinese Communist Party, under Mao Zedong, triumphed over the Nationalist
Chinese Party (Kuomintang) lead by Chiang Kai-shek. The PRC now also includes
Hong Kong (whose sovereignty reverted to China from the UK in 1997) and Macau
(whose sovereignty reverted to China from Portugal in 1999). Taiwan remains estranged
from the PRC and operates, at many levels, as a separate international entity, although
the clear majority of nations do not recognize Taiwan as a separate country-least of all,
the PRC. The term "Mainland China" is the usual shorthand used to denote that part of
the PRC where the CCP still operates a one-party-state. Hong Kong and Macau are now
Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of the PRC. Although as SARS they are denied
representative-democratic government, they each enjoy significantly enhanced political
and individual freedoms compared to Mainland China. (By the expression East Asia, we
mean, principally, that part of Asia including Greater China (PRC-Mainland, PRC-SARS,
and Taiwan), Japan, and Korea).
2. China's current population is estimated to be at least 1.3 billion.
3. James Wolfensohn (President, World Bank), Long-Term Plan Helps China
Succeed in Poverty Reduction, at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:2020633
0-menuPK:219671-pagePK: 159837-piPK: 159808-theSitePK:227585,00.html (May 21,
2004); see also China is a Model for Poverty Reduction: WB Official at http://www.china.
org.cn/english/BAT/56633.htm. (Feb. 25, 2003).
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economic balance between the State and the totality of its citizens is a lot
less one-sided than was previously the case.
One place where we can see this economic reality having a significant
impact is in the development of the media in China. Since the 1980s, there
has been an explosion of publishing (books, magazines, and newspapers),
broadcast TV, cable TV, and satellite TV to meet the huge and constantly
4
growing demand for information and entertainment. China likely now has
more homes connected to cable TV than any other nation plus thousands
of broadcast TV stations. The OPS has worked very hard to try and keep
control of media content-especially political content-with some
success. Nominally, all media outlets remain under the control of the5
OPS and extensive monitoring and censorship regimes remain in place.
But the task of the controllers grows more difficult rather than less, as
both wealth and technology usage continues to expand in China.
When we look at the "new media" modes, we see a similar pattern of
massive growth. We can also see that the Internet has presented China's
6
"content police" with one of their greatest challenges. Text messaging via
mobile telephones is another area of growing, mass written communication
which is also presenting a content regulation "test" for the Chinese
government.7
The following part of this paper provides a review of how the use of
the Internet has grown and been regulated in China. We then draw some
conclusions on what the experience to date may have to tell us about
future regulatory and usage patterns with respect to the Internet in China.

4. See H. L. Fu & RICHARD CULLEN, MEDIA LAW INTHE PRC (Hong Kong: Asia
Law & Practice, 1996).
5. Id.
6. China is far from alone in deciding it must throw resources into controlling
political content on the internet. Repressive controls in the Arab world are equally if not
even more omnipresent, for example. See Watch Out: Arabs and the Internet, ECONOMIST,
July 10, 2004, at 43.
7. China, with 1.3 billion people, has around 305 million mobile phone subscribers
and some 295 million fixed-line users. India, by way of contrast, has a population of 1
billion and less than 40 million mobile phone subscribers. It is estimated that almost
seventy percent of Chinese people who can afford a mobile phone have one. Rohit
Sobti, an analyst with Citigroup, said: "No other developing country has created such
penetration in such a short time. There is ridiculous connectivity in China." Telecoms in
China: Disconnected,ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004, at 59.

II. THE INTERNET IN CHINA

A. Overview
Compared with the United States, the history of China's Internet is
relatively short. The first computer network in China did not appear until
1987. At the beginning, all the networks in China could only be used for
academic and research purposes. Commercial use of the Internet did not
start until mid-1995. Despite its comparatively late commencement,
China's Internet usage has developed quickly since. By January 2003, the
Internet using population had already reached almost 60 million.
The fast development of the Internet in China has created a significant
dilemma for the Chinese government. For Beijing, involvement in the
Internet resembles a "love-hate" relationship. On the one hand, due to
practical necessity, the Chinese government understands very well that
the powerful communication possibilities of the Internet are crucial in
helping China: a) to communicate internally and with other parts of the
world; b) to enhance its economy; and c) to strengthen its government
administration. On the other hand, China is deeply concerned about the
potential harmful impact of the Internet.
It is true that every country is cautious about potential negative
features of the Internet, but China's concerns in this regard are rather
special. Beijing is particularly worried about the potential political
implications of the Internet. This over-sensitivity about politics arises
from the contradictions between China's political system and the nature
of the Internet. The political solidarity of China's OPS depends heavily
upon maintaining ideological unanimity, and this, in turn, necessitates
close State control of all information flows. A key reason for the popularity
of the Internet, however, is its power to facilitate instantaneous
communication without being subject to any significant constraints. This
makes the Chinese government worry that if the Internet communication
gateway is opened completely, it will lose control over the flow of
information in China.
In order to ensure a "pollution-free" Internet environment (in the political
sense, in particular), the Chinese government has established a complicated
regulatory framework to regulate the Internet industry. Numerous
government and quasi-government bodies are included in this Internet
regulatory framework, and they are responsible for monitoring all
aspects of the operation of the Internet, ranging from regulating the
manufacturing of network equipment to the monitoring of the activities
8. China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC), lth Statistical Survey
on the Internet Development in China (Jan. 2003), at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/download/
manual/en-reports/11 .pdf[hereinafter January 2003 Report].
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of Internet users. Since many bodies are involved, overlapping jurisdictions
are inevitable, thus making the situation very confusing, especially for
those trying to comply with all these regulations.
In addition to the establishment of a regulatory framework to regulate
the Internet itself, the Chinese government has, since 1996, also promulgated
a series of regulations governing all the persons involved in China's
Internet (including Internet users, Internet Service Providers, Internet
Content Providers, and entities providing international network connections).
In recent years, many high ranking officials, including the now-former
PRC President Jiang Zemin and the now-former Premier of the State
Council Zhu Rongji, have emphasized the importance of the
"informationalization" of China. 9 The political situation in China remains
unchanged, however. The result is that the Internet in China is developing
whilst still caught in a "tug-of-war" between the expansion of its application
(mainly in the commercial sphere) and the restriction of its possible
negative political impact.
In dealing with the Internet, China is trying to maintain its traditional
attitude towards new technologies, which is to use such technologies to
strengthen the power of the sovereign and to enhance economic prosperity
on the one hand, while avoiding (or at least minimizing) "negative"
political impacts on the other. In fact, however, economic and political
development (and information flows) are interrelated, thus the Chinese
government cannot hope, over any substantial time frame, to continue to
extract optimum economic benefits from an expansion of the Internet
without also tolerating to a significantly greater extent its political impact.
B. Growth in Internet Usage
The Internet is already established as a major person-to-person
communication tool in China. The use of the Internet for e-commerce is
still at an infant stage in China, however. According to a China Internet
Network Information Centre (CNNIC) survey, only 33.8 percent of
Chinese Internet users shopped on-line in 2002.1 Nevertheless, both the
government and some commentators are optimistic that e-commerce has

9. CHINA'S CENTURY: THE AWAKENING OF THE NEXT ECONOMIC POWERHOUSE 31516 (LAURENCE BRAHM ed. 2001) [hereinafter CHNA'S CENTURY]; see also JOHN NAH SEOK
LING, CHINA'S EMERGING NEW ECONOMY: THE INTERNET AND E-COMMERCE 27-31
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001).
10. January 2003 Report, supra note 8, at 16.

great potential to grow in China."
The Chinese government is also enthusiastic about extending the
Internet's application to government administration. In 1999, the Chinese
government announced the beginning of the so-called "Government
Online Project."' 12 One of the aims of this project is to increase the
transparency and efficiency of the government by establishing an "electronic
government on the Internet" and the "digitizing of government services."
Also, it is hoped that by encouraging all government bodies to operate
online, communications among various government bodies, as well as
between the central authorities and local governments, can be
improved. 13 Although there are now more than 7,000 websites with the
domain name gov.cn in China,14 it seems there is still a long way to go
before the goals of the Government Online Project can be genuinely
achieved. Many of the existing government websites are simply
propaganda tools and exist only as a formality. As Jin Xin, a foreign
affairs department official of the Central Government, has remarked:
...by taking a look at those existing government websites, one will find that
most of them have only posted the functions of their host departments and their
working documents. More mobile and interactive information is lacking. They
have failed to fully understand the characteristics of the Internet-getting wired
is simply a formality. Many of them have even failed to put the address, contact
number and e-mail address of the relevant department on the website. It appears
that they are afraid that people will come to "knock at their doors."
So don't
expect to find the details of the "mayor's mailbox" on the Internet. 15

Apart from using the Internet to enhance government administration,
the Chinese government has also been quick to discover that, just like
other media, such as newspapers and television, the Internet can be
deployed as a propaganda tool. For example, the website of the China
Internet Information Centre is said to be the "official gateway to news
and information" about China.' 6 In addition to providing the most up-todate information about China, this website also disseminates a lot of
information regarding the Chinese government's stance on various
controversial issues, such as its views on the Taiwan issue17 and its
11. Peter Yip, How the Internet Will Shape China, in CHINA's CENTURY, supra
note 9, at 331.
12. For details about the development of China's "Government Online Project,"
see the website of Zhengfu Shangwang Gongcheng (Government Online Project), at
http://www.govonline.cn/frontmanger/5year01 .htm.
13. The term "local government" is commonly used in China to include all noncentral governments at provincial, city, and township levels.
14. January 2003 Report, supra note 8, at 5.
15. Jin Xin, Who is Going to Protect the Government?, in JIN XIN, ZHONGGUO
WENTI BAOGAO (REPORTS ON CHINA'S QUESTIONS) 417 (Beijing: China Social Science
Press, 2000).
16. China Internet Information Centre, at http://www.china.org.cn.
17. China Internet Information Centre, Concerns over the New Development of
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religious policies.18 Furthermore, the CCP has made use of this platform
to advance its political agenda. 19 Also, another website, China's Human
Rights, though not run by the government, serves the function of
promoting the Chinese government's version of human rights.2 °
C. IncreasingControl
Over the last few years, China has promulgated numerous examples of
Internet-related legislation. Despite the fact that these laws carry new
titles, a detailed review of their content shows that they are generally
"old wine in new bottles." The legislative intent of all the Internetrelated legislation has not changed: to control the information flow on
China's Internet. These so-called new laws are simply more detailed
laws addressing various aspects of the operation of Internet. The
fundamental trend has been to extend the State's regulatory arm "down
the food chain" from the actual, technical, service providers through to
content providers and finally through to "Internet cafes" and their users.
The moves to control Internet Content Providers (ICPs) directly in the
regulations provide a case in point. On September 25, 2000, the
Measures for the Management of the Internet Information Services (ICP
Measures) were passed. 21 The ICP Measures represent the first law
specifically regulating ICPs in China. The previous legislation (such as
that listed below) targeted just Internet Service Providers (ISPs)-and
did not explicitly mention applicability to ICPs.
As far as ISPs are concerned, there are numerous regulations imposing
duties on them. Very often, these regulations hold the ISPs responsible
for the information they provide and for the activities of their subscribers.
For example, under the Provisions on Safeguarding the Security of
Domestic Computer Networks in Linking with the Internet (11 December
1997) (the PSB Provisions), 2 ISPs are required to assume the following
Taiwan Independence,at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/TCC/100612.htm.
18. China Internet Information Centre, China 's Religious Retrospect and Prospect,
at http://www.china.org,cn/english/features/45367.htm.
19. China Internet Information Centre, Learn and Continue Implementing the
Spirit of the Sixteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress, at http://ww.china.org.cn/
chinese/zhuanti/238928.htm.
20. China's Human Rights, at http://www.humanrights-china.org (last visited Jan.
19, 2004) (this website, which began operating in 1998, is run by the China Society for
Human Rights).
21. For the full text of the ICP Measures (in Chinese), see http://www.cnnic.
net.cn/html/Dir/2000/09/25/0652.htm.
22. For the full text of the PSB Provisions (in Chinese), see http://www.cnnic.net.

responsibilities:
(1) assume responsibility for network security, protection and
management and establish a thoroughly secure, protected and
well managed network;
(2) carry out technical measures for network security and
protection and ensure network operational security and
information security;
(3) assume responsibility for the security, education and training
of network users;
(4) register units and individuals to whom information is
provided and examine the information provided and make
sure that no prohibited information is provided;
(5) establish a system for registering the users of electronic
bulletin board systems on the computer information network
as well as a system for managing bulletin board information;
(6) keep records of any violations of the PSB Provisions and
report to the public security organs; and
(7) according to the relevant State regulations, remove from the
network any address, directory or server that has prohibited
contents.23
Under the PSB Provisions, information which can be categorized as
illegal, immoral, or endangering the interests of the government or
socialist system of China is prohibited information.24
For ISPs who fail to satisfy these obligations, their rights to international
25
connection
may be cancelled.
if any
activity
(widely defined-see
below) can beWorse
shownstill,
to have
takencriminal
place, the
ISPs
cn/htmil/Dir/1997/12/11/0650.htm.
23. PSB Provisions, art. 10.
24. According to Article 5 of the PSB Provisions, the nine categories of prohibited
information are:
1) materials inciting resistance or inciting behaviors contrary to the
Constitution or laws or the implementation of administrative regulations;
2) materials inciting the overthrow of the government or the socialist system;
3) materials inciting division of the country, harming national unification;
4) materials inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming
the unity of the nationalities;
5) materials containing falsehoods or distorting the truth, or spreading
rumours, or destroying the order of society;
6) materials promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material,
gambling, violence, murder, terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity;
7) materials openly insulting other people or distorting the truth to slander
people;
8) materials injuring the reputation of State organs; and
9) materials encouraging other activities against the Constitution, laws or
administrative regulations.
25. Id. atart. 21.

[VOL.

6: 323, 2005]

China'sMedia: The Impact of the Internet
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

may be subject to criminal liability.
For ICPs, the ICP Measures make it clear that the liabilities of ICPs-as
to their Internet content-are no less than the liabilities of ISPs. Indeed,
they are subject to even more stringent control. Before applying for an
operating permit from the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), each
ICP is subject to examination by different government departments,
depending on the nature of the content provided. For example, if the
content includes news, then the ICP is required to obtain the relevant
approval from the State Press and Publishing Bureau.26 Another way to
prevent "undesirable" information from flowing into China's Internet is
to regulate both the virtual and real gathering places of the "netizens."
In order to regulate virtual gathering places, the Chinese government
adopted the Provisions for the Administration of Electronic Bulletin
27 To
Board System Services (8 October 2000) (the BBS Measures).
regulate real gathering places, the government adopted the Methods for
Management of Business Places of Internet On-line Services (3 April
2001) (the Internet Bar Measures).2 8 As far as the BBS Measures are
concerned, the liability of the BBS service providers under these
Measures is similar to that of ISPs-they are required to monitor the
information posted on their BBS and to keep records of the details of
BBS users (including their Internet addresses), the content they post on
each BBS, as well as the time of posting of that information." The
Internet Bar Measures, as the name suggests, regulates the Internet
services centers in China, i.e. the so-called "Internet bars" or the "cyber
cafes." In addition, they require the operators of Internet bars to monitor
their customers' activities on the Internet closely. Since all the "gates"
to the Internet's virtual world are guarded, it appears that such a requirement
may not be necessary. In fact, the symbolic value of imposing such
requirements may outweigh the practical value, especially because it is
very difficult, if not impossible, for the operators of the Internet bars to
check the identities of their customers.
Leaking information relating to national security and state secrets
remains one of the major concerns of the Chinese government. On
January 1, 2000, the State Secrets Protection Regulations for Computer
26. ICP Measures, art. 5.
27. For the full text of the BBS Measures (in Chinese), see http://www.cnnic.
net.cn/htmil/Dir/2000/10/08/0653.htm.
28. For the full text of the Internet Bar Measures (in Chinese), see http://www.
cnnic net.cn/html/Dir/2003/12/12/1 995.htm.
29. BBS Measures, art. 14.

Information Systems on the Internet (the Internet Secrecy Regulations)
came into effect.3" These Regulations specifically and comprehensively
address problems related to the disclosure of state secrets through the
Internet in China. Article 1 of the Regulations states: "[T]hese Regulations
have been formulated pursuant to the 'Law of the People's Republic of
China on the Protection of State Secrets (State Secrets Law)' and other
relevant laws and regulations of China, in order to strengthen the
administration of maintenance of secrets in the international networking
of computer information systems and to ensure the security of state
secrets." When we refer to the State Secrets Law, we find that the Chinese
definition of state secrets is so broad that it can cover almost everything.3'
Moreover, each executive body which produces information has the final
power to decide whether a particular piece of information is "state
secret," and the courts have no power to review such decisions. As a
result, even unpublished interest rate changes, 32 a speech to be made by
Jiang Zemin,33 and the statistics on the number of persons being executed
have been treated as state secrets. Many dissidents and journalists have
been convicted for "leaking state secrets." The transmission of information
on the Internet is readily caught under these new Regulations. Article 8
of the Internet Secrecy Regulations stipulates that "responsibility [for
leaked secrets] is borne by the person who placed it on the network."
This does not, however, exempt each ISP's obligation to monitor. Under
Article 10, ISPs, BBS, chat rooms, and network news group organizers
are required to set up their own management mechanisms to assist in
ensuring that no state secrets are transmitted on the Internet by their
30. For the full text of the Internet Secrecy Regulations (in Chinese), see
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/html/Dir/2003/11/27/1482.htm.
31. See PRC Law on Protecting State Secrets, art. 8, available at http://www.
chinaonline.com/refer/legal/Mmeyerlaws/pdf/pdfc/C00012671CEpdf.
State secrets
can include, for example, the color of the carpet in a ministerial tea room. Such
decorating data was not so long ago also capable of being categorized as an "official
secret" in the UK.
32. Xi Yang was a journalist with Mingpao, one of Hong Kong's more notable
newspapers. He was arrested for "espionage regarding state financial secrets." The
alleged secrets were "unpublished interest rate changes and information on the bank's
plan for international gold transactions." He was subsequently sentenced to twelve years
imprisonment at a closed trial. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Article 19 and
the Hong Kong Journalists Association, Freedom of Expression in HONG KONG: 1994
ANNUAL REPORT (JOINT REPORT OF THE ARTICLE 19 GROUP AND THE HONG KONG

JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION) (June 30, 1994).
33. Leung Waiman was a journalist for the Hong Kong newspaper, Express Daily.
She was arrested in Beijing in October 1992 while reporting the Fourteenth Chinese
Communist Party Congress and the visit of Chris Patten to Beijing. She was accused of
"offering bribes to mainland officials in exchange of confidential documents."
The
"confidential document" in question was a copy of a speech to be made by the then Party
Secretary General (and President) Jiang Zemin. For a detailed discussion of this case,
see id.
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users. Given the uncertainty of the ambit of the term state secrets in China,
to avoid any violation, it is suspected that many of these informationorganizers prefer to remove information once they have any doubt as to
the nature of the information. If that is the case, then citizens' right to
have access to official information is being compromised. Another
problematic area with these Regulations is that information must be
inspected and have obtained approval before it can be provided to or
released onto the Internet.3 4 This kind of prior censorship undermines
the instant communication power of the Internet, as well as the free flow
of information on the Internet.
Whilst considering the issue of the publication of state secrets on the
Internet, one more piece of legislation should be mentioned-the
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Questions
Relating to the Application of Law in Handling Cases involving
Stealing, Spying into, Buying, and Unlawful Supply of State Secrets or
Intelligence for Organisations or Individuals Outside the Chinese
Territory (SPC Interpretation).3 5 The SPC Interpretation was issued on
January 17, 2001 and aims at setting out the sentencing guidelines for
the crime of espionage under Article 111 of the Criminal Law. Article 6
of the SPC Interpretation, however, makes specific reference to the
committing of relevant crimes using the Internet, and it states:
Whoever unlawfully disseminates State secrets or intelligence to any organ,
organization or individual outside the territory of China through the Internet
shall be punished according to Article 111 of the Criminal Law; whoever
are serious,
disseminates State secrets through the Internet, if the circumstances
36
shall be punished according to Article 398 of the Criminal Law.

"Intelligence" is defined as "items concerning the security and interests
of the State which have not been publicized or should not be publicized
in accordance with the relevant laws." 37 This provision casts an even
wider net than the Internet Secrecy Regulations. The maximum sentence
State secrets or intelligence
for anyone who is convicted of transmitting
38
penalty.
death
the
is
world
to the outside
34. State Secrecy Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems on the
Internet, art. 8, available at http://www.novexcn.com/state_secreyinternet.htnl (last
visited Jan. 18, 2005).
35. For the full text of the SPC Interpretation, see Fa Shi [2001] 4 Hao Zuigao
Remnin Fayuan Gonggao (Legal Interpretation [2001] No. 4 Supreme People's Court
Notice) in FUJIAN RIBAO, Feb. 22, 2001.

36.

SPC Interpretation, art. 6.

37.

Id. at art. 1.

38.

Id. at art. 6; Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 111 & 113.

On January 29, 2002, the Internet Society of China, a non-governmental
organization which has close links with the MII, issued the SelfDisciplinary Agreement for the Internet Industry in China (SelfDisciplinary Agreement).3 9 All the players in China's Internet Industry,
including Internet operators (those who engage in the provision of
Internet application services) and Internet information services (those
who develop and produce Internet products and network information
resources) have been invited to sign this Agreement. 40 As set out in
Article 1, the purpose of this Agreement is to establish a self-regulatory
system within the Internet Industry so as to enhance the "healthy"
development of the Internet Industry in China.4 1 Under the Self-Disciplinary
Agreement, the contents of self-regulation include prevention of
competition by using unlawful means,4" protection of the legal rights of
consumers, 43 protection of copyright, 44 prohibition of illegal access and
destruction of computer systems of others, 45 prohibition of malicious
attacks on the computer programs of others,4 and most importantly,
ensuring no "harmful" information can be accessed through the Intemet in
China.4 As far as control over Internet content is concerned, the
requirements under the Self-Disciplinary Agreement are no more than a
reiteration of those relevant measures as set out in various laws and
regulations. Thus, the Self-Disciplinary Agreement is another tactic used by
the Chinese government to strengthen its control over the Internet.
By November of 2002, three hundred Chinese firms were reported to
have signed the Self-Disciplinary Agreement.48 Yahoo, one of the biggest
foreign-based Internet companies in China, is also a signatory. Yahoo's
signing of the Self-Disciplinary Agreement was subject to strong criticism.49
The Human Rights Watch organization condemned it as "facilitating
censorship by the [Chinese] government" and violating the right to
freedom of expression.50
39. For the full text of the Self-Disciplinary Agreement (in Chinese), see SelfDisciplinary Agreement for the Internet Industry in China (Full Text) at http://big5.
china. com.cn/chinese/PI-c/590141 .htm.
40. Self-Disciplinary Agreement, art. 2.
41. Id. atart. 1.
42. Id. at art. 9.
43. Id. at art. 8.
44. Id.atart. 12.
45. Id . at art. 13.
46. Id.
47. Id. at arts. 10-12.
48. Ethan Gutmann, Up Against the Firewall, 119 RED HERRING, Nov. 2002, at 36.
49. See Editorial, Yahoo's China Concession, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2002, at A12.
50. Human Rights Watch, Yahoo! Risks Abusing Rights in China: Human Rights
Watch Letter to Terry Semel (30 July 30, 2002), at http://hrw.org/press/2002/08/yahooltr073002.htm; see also Human Rights Watch, Yahoo! Risks Abusing Rights in China
(Aug. 9, 2002), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/yahooO8O9O2.htm.
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Apart from imposing responsibilities on various players in the Internet
industry, the Chinese government itself (as the ultimate gatekeeper) has
also taken numerous measures to control Internet content. Using firewalls
and other filtering technologies to block "undesirable" information and
censor emails has long been a major method used by the Chinese
government. Most of these powerful technologies were bought from
foreign firms who have been happy to accept the lucrative contracts on
offer. 5 1 For example, it has been reported that China bought a firewall
product with the ability to track the activities of Internet users from
Nortel. 2 The government also authorizes routine crackdowns on BBS,
chat-rooms, and Internet bars. The use of the criminal law is still,
however, the most intimidating method of control.
As the popularity of the Internet continues to increase, it is not
surprising that the number of Internet-related crimes is also growing.
This phenomenon is not unique to China and is seen in other countries as
well. The situation in China, however, is somewhat different from that
found in liberal-democratic jurisdictions. Undoubtedly, the continuous
increase in the number of Internet-related crimes in China is partly due
to the deliberate misapplication of the Internet for purposes such as
"hacking," tax evasion, and online fraud. This growth in the incidence
of crime, though, is also partly attributable to the Chinese government's
enthusiasm for maintaining a "politically pure" Internet environment.
In recent years, the Chinese law enforcement agencies have been
actively fighting Internet crime. Most of these crimes are related to the
'illegal' application of the Internet in a political sense, such as criticizing
government bodies or the CCP, calling for political reforms in China,
and sending politically sensitive information (including information
was proscribed
concerning the Falungong, a quasi-religious group which
3
by the Chinese government in 1999) via the Internet.
D. Public Policy Impact
Despite all the restrictions, access to the Internet in China has now
51.

See Gutmann, supra note 48.

52. David Lee, Multinationals Making a Mint from China's Great Firewall, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 2, 2002, at 16.
53. For a summary of some recent internet-related cases in China, see generally
Human Rights Watch, Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China: A Human
Rights Watch Backgrounder, at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.pdf
and Human Rights Watch, China Human Rights Update, Feb. 2002, at http://hrw.
org/backgrounder/asia/chinaupdate.pdf.

grown to such an extent that it has become a key zone for the public
discussion of "hot topics." As in the West, it is the more educated, usually
urban class that is most likely to have ready Internet access-the same
class that tends to have the greatest impact on shaping public opinion.
Over recent years, "citizen-discussions" on the Internet have traversed
a range of matters including the handling of the SARS crisis in China,54
certain international incidents, abuse of power and position by the newly
wealthy, and high profile instances of police and official corruption and
abuse of power. Such general discussions almost always steer clear of
"forbidden topics" such as the legitimacy of the OPS, the performance of
the most senior leaders, and Tibet and Taiwan separatism. Increasingly,
though, such discussions do canvass day-to-day official performance that
can, in turn, give rise to some spirited policy debates.
Although at one level, the OPS seems all powerful, at another, the very
centrality of the CCP amplifies its vulnerability. It is the only serious
political party allowed to exist in China. It follows, then, that the CCP is
nominally responsible for all government policy failures and government
operational failures. This is a key reason why the CCP is so sensitive
about public opinion-and why it devotes so much energy trying to
control information flows and manage public perceptions. Stark, day-today abuses of official power are clearly beyond any justification by the
CCP (indeed, the CCP repeatedly claims to be dedicated to stamping
them out). Such abuses comprise a constant source of discussion amongst
ordinary people and, with the arrival of the Internet (and other cheap,
swift mass communication modes), those discussions can quickly drawin millions of observers and participants."
Recent examples of this phenomenon at work include the case of Sun
Zhigang and the death of Li Siyi. In the first case, Sun Zhigang, a graphic
designer from Wuhan in Hebei Province, was detained by police in
Guangzhou in Guangdong Province on March 17, 2003 because he was
not able to produce the local, temporary residence permit which the
police said he had to carry. Within a week he died from beatings he
received whilst in official custody. 56 In the second case, a three-year old
girl was left to starve to death in the city of Chengdu in Sichuan
54. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) hit China, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Vietnam, Taiwan, and Toronto in Canada seriously in early 2003 resulting in many deaths and
major outbreaks of illness. See generally D.K. Srivastava & Richard Cullen, SARS in the
HKSAR: Some ImportantLegal Issues, (July 2003) HONG KONG LAwYER 71.
55. Bobson Wong, The Tug-of-War for Control of China's Internet, at http:/iso.
hrichina.org/downloadrepository/2/a3togofwar.2004.pdf
56. For further details, see Chinese Protest Online: The Case of Sun Zhigang, at
http://humanrightswatch.org/campaigns/china/beijing08/voices.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2004); see also Sun Zhigang's Brutal Killers Sentenced (June 6, 2003), at. http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-06/10/content_168514.htm.
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Province in June 2003. The local police arrested and detained the girl's
drug addict mother-and then failed to take the necessary steps to look
they had been told by the mother
fact that
the room
after the baby girl despite
alone.h
in her
locked
was
Siyi
Li
that
Details of both these cases found their way into the public domain
initially via the Internet. As the facts became know in these (and other)
cases, public outrage spread rapidly across China and grew in intensity.
As this process gathered pace, the regular media began to repeat the
stories. Official investigations eventually followed, and public disciplinary
measures and criminal punishments were imposed on certain police
58
officers and other officials held to be responsible.
The publicity surrounding the Sun Zhigang case also lead directly to
Beijing scrapping the decades old anti-vagrancy laws, which had lead to
59
Mr. Sun's detention by the police in the first place.
The Sun Zhigang case had further consequences. One of China's most
successful and liberal newspapers is the Southern Metropolis News,
based in Guangzhou. The editor of the Southern Metropolis Daily, Cheng
Yizhong, ran an expose on Sun Zhigang's case after discussion of it
began to spread rapidly on the Internet. Local CCP officials in Guangzhou
objected strongly to Mr. Cheng's decision., and he was arrested and held
in custody for approximately five months on fraud charges. This time
pressure was brought to bear in Beijing by some party elders in
Guangzhou, who were unhappy with this fairly obvious attempt to
punish Cheng for running the story on the scandal surrounding the arrest
and slaying of Sun Zhigang whilst he was in official custody. Pressure
was also brought to bear as a result of spirited online discussions by
to Starve (June 26, 2003), at
57. See BBC World News, China Police Leave Child
23
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/30 030.stm; see also, Ren
Bumei, After Li Siyi, (No.4, 2003) CHINA RIGHTS FORUM 33, available at http://www.
hrichina.org/fs/view/downloadables/pdf/downloadable-resources/ a3_Lisiyi4.2003.pdf.
58. The two police officers who put Li Siyi's mother under detention were
convicted of neglecting their duties and sentenced to thee years' and two years'
imprisonment respectively. See Chongqing Wanbao, Let Persons who Neglect their
Duties to be Accountable, CHONGQING EVENING POST, Dec. 20, 2004. The principal
offender in Sun Zhigang's case was convicted of dereliction of duty and sentenced to
death, and other defendants in this case were convicted of the same offence and
sentenced to a suspended death sentence, life imprisonment, or fixed-term imprisonment.
59. The Measures for the Custody and Repatriation of Vagrant Beggars in the
Cities, which was promulgated by the State Council in May 1982, was abolished in June
2003. See Abolishing the Measuresfor the Custody and Repatriationof Vagrant Beggars
in the Cities, Xinhua Net, June 19, 2003, available in China Internet Information Centre, at

http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/law/349194.htm.

academics in Guangzhou and Beijing outraged by what had happened to
Cheng Yizhong. As a result of public indignation and this pressure, Cheng
Yizhong was released from official custody without being charged, and
it seems he will resume his editorial duties. 6°
What these and similar cases indicate is that, although the OPS has
thus far been fairly successful in putting the Internet to use in the
interests of the State, the Internet is clearly a "knife which cuts in more
than one direction," despite all the attempts to control it. The CCP
cannot justify-and does not want to justify-day-to-day abuses of
power; and the growth in mass, cheap, person-to-person communication
modes in Mainland China means the State has increasingly limited
control over group discussion of such issues. In the case of the old antivagrancy laws, reform was affected almost at the stroke of a pen and
with few immediate cost implications. We now, thus, see in certain
limited circumstances the CCP being directly influenced in its public
policy decisions by Internet-driven mass discussions.
III. CONCLUSION
The Internet has developed very quickly in China in recent years, but
official policy has been to try and restrict its development so as to serve
economic and, to a lesser extent, social purposes. The Internet has had
an impact in terms of opening political discussion in China to a limited
degree, but its chief political role, increasingly, has been to improve and
increase CCP control. It has been used to convey Party policy and to
help control and suppress opponents. In this respect, it is being used just
like the traditional media.
For the last two centuries, China's attitude towards western technology
has been to adopt such on a "need to use" basis. The major purposes
behind acceptance have always been: a) the strengthening of the sovereign
power; and b) the enhancement of economic prosperity. For example,
during the "Self-Strengthening Movement" in 1860, the most popular
slogan propagated by the Qing government was "Chinese teachings as
fundamental basis, Western learning for practical usage." The "OpenDoor" policy proposed by Deng Xiaoping also aimed at improving the
economic development of China whilst strengthening the CCP. It is
arguable that this conflicted attitude towards technology, innovation, and
new ideas provides part of the explanation for China's comparative
political and economic backwardness.
As the 21st century begins, this historical legacy is as evident as ever
in China's less-than-complete embrace of the Internet. It is widely
60.
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believed, however, that economic prosperity and political development
61
need, over the medium-long term, to proceed hand-in-hand. Neither of
them can maintain steady, successful development, other than over a
short term, without the support of one another. In other words, in the
long run, if China is going to continue advancing its economic
development, it is left with little choice but to make some political
concessions. With respect to the Internet, this means that while China is
trying to maximize the economic benefits available from the Internet, the
Chinese government should be preparing itself to tolerate (if not
embrace) the predictable "side effects." To date, the full political
implications of the Internet are still too much for the Chinese
government to accept. This is clearly evident in the regulatory approach
with respect to the Internet detailed above. The government has
produced a multi-layered, often jumbled, regulatory regime designed
principally to control information flows on the Internet-a regime which
is still growing.
Despite this growth in control mechanisms, the Internet is having
some impact in freeing up information flows. It has facilitated both
mass and specialist discussions on a range of matters including everyday
abuses of official power and certain other topics which, in today's China,
are now considered less risky to talk about. The CCP is officially
committed to making Mainland China a better, fairer place for the
citizens of China. It is more difficult today for the Party to suppress
demands by citizens for remedies to particular ills in Chinese society that
the CCP says it too wants to remedy. At the same time, it is easier than
before for citizens to engage in electronic mass discussions focused on
such issues.
It is clear that in the near to medium term, the tension between the
benefits arising from the free flow of information and the desire for
government control will continue to be the chief unresolved problem in
the development of China's Internet.

61. See, e.g., Cesar Bacini, Nation's Economic Growth could Provide a Marketfor
Democracy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 13, 2003, at 15.
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